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This study is concerned with the Finnish government’s political programmes (N=42) from the
1950s to the present. Its objective is to examine how conceptions of the welfare state have
changed over the past 65 years. The analysis concentrates on the social and health care sectors
as indicators of the content and nature of the ambitions set for the welfare system by the highest
political leadership. The programmes were examined for their aims, character and concepts.
The governments’ changing position towards its welfare political mandate emerges in three
distinct periods: 1) 1950 through the 1970s, when the welfare state was being constructed; 2)
the 1980s and 1990s, as the concept was further developed and internally synchronized; and
3) 2000 to 2015, a time of increasing estrangement from universal notions. The study shows
that as late as 2014, the welfare state’s aims of inclusion and universalism were dramatically
toned down to an absolute minimum in the government programmes. The article shows that
in contemporary times, the coalition government system may have strengthened the welfare
state ethos. This is a finding of great significance for a structural-political perspective on the
support of welfare state ideas.
Introduction
In the classical division of welfare state models by Esping-
Andersen (1990), the Nordic, or social democratic, variant
entails particular value prioritizations. It involves a belief
in universal welfare for everyone and a trust in autonomous
public institutions executing their welfare political goals.
This type of welfare state has been described as an all-
encompassing form of solidarity. Dignity and value come
with citizenship; because everyone is equally at risk of mis-
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fortune, no further expectations are placed on the citizen in
the welfare provision system (Julkunen 2006). Widely based
solidarity and the aim of caring for less fortunate citizens
have been strong (Anttonen & Sipilä 2000). High income
taxation, used to finance centralized and universal service
provision, is perhaps the most well-known systemic proce-
dure for achieving the collective-based welfare system envi-
sioned in the model.
With regard to the constitution and maintenance of this
type of welfare system, compassion for human suffering and
good intentions in regard to helping weak and marginalized
groups are not sufficient ends in themselves. Such ambitions
can just as well lead to welfare pluralistic social policy or
non-institutionalized and residual solutions such as ad hoc
charity and social work by the church (Anttonen & Sipilä
2000, 106). The existence of a universal system that per-
meates a country’s institutional configurations depends on
whether the interest groups behind the state power and its
legitimacy view it as an appropriate alternative and advance
in their strategies (ibid.). The support and maintenance of
the Nordic welfare system have been shown to require con-
stant justifications in political visions and strategies. This is
an ongoing discursive effort that must endure in the different
arenas in which political and governmental aims are articu-
lated.
This study examines how 42 Finnish government pro-
grammes have articulated ideas surrounding the welfare state
from the 1950s to the present. These 65 years in Finnish
history encompass the first post-war construction of a wel-
fare society, followed by the establishment and reorganiza-
tion of the same. Although their formats have changed over
time, the Finnish government programmes have retained a
somewhat consistent historical function: to serve as an of-
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ficial declaration of what the elected government envisions
and hopes to achieve during its time in office.
The importance of government programmes in communi-
cating the political strategies that underpin the development
of the Finnish welfare state should not be underestimated:
their rhetoric has been shown to carry great potential for in-
stitutional change (Erkkilä 2010, 353-354). In fact, the so-
cietal structure can be viewed as being articulated and re-
produced in the political construction rituals of the platforms
(see Heiskala 2001). Finalized in negotiations between the
winning parties after the general election, they articulate the
direction that the country should take as a whole, as voiced
by the highest political leadership. In what ways, then, has
the development of Finland’s government programmes en-
tailed ideological shifts pertaining to the scope and mandate
of the welfare state?
This study sets out to investigate how the programmes en-
vision developments in the social and health sectors in a long
view. As classical social policy cornerstones of the Nordic
universal welfare state, the social and health sectors are here
viewed as indicators of the system’s content and nature (Hell-
man et al. 2012). The analysis seeks to provide an updated
periodization narrative based on the discursive governance
of the top political leadership. This is achieved through ex-
amining the aims and directions envisioned in the platforms
and by studying the characteristics of the genre in view of
the government’s position and, the priorities reflected in the
concepts and language used.
The study is situated in a structural-political perspective,
in that it observes that a continuous interplay between the
social structure and political action underpins the building
and maintenance of the Finnish welfare state (Alestalo et
al. 1986). The article begins with broad accounts of some
characteristics in the Finnish welfare state and some recent
trends in its modes of governance. Subsequently, it accounts
for a diachronic analysis of the government programmes
from 1950 through 2015, asking how the welfare state as a
project has been articulated over time. Finally, conclusions
are drawn regarding what the results mean from a structural-
political perspective.
Universal welfare in Finland
The particularities in the Finnish universal welfare state
can be explained in view of the country’s political history. In
Finland, as in the other Nordic countries, it has been histor-
ically safe and wise to make a moderate distinction between
communist and capitalist ideologies and to augment public
management by patiently increasing universal services over
time (Julkunen 2006; Uusitalo 1984). Doing so has im-
proved the working population’s ability to participate in oc-
cupational life and has been an economic advantage for Fin-
land (Kantola 2006, 21). The tripartite political negotiations
(labour unions – state – employers’ organizations) have been
viewed as supporting economic competition without risking
the aims of equality.
In Hiilamo’s (2014) account, an important backdrop for
the Finnish welfare state’s characteristics is the country’s
Civil War in 1918 between the Reds (led by radicals in the
Social Democratic Party and Bolshevik sympathizers) and
the Whites (led by the Senate). In the wake of this war – one
of the bloodiest civil wars on the European continent – key
elements of the rebuilding process included expanding social
policies, implementing extensive land reforms, modernizing
the educational system and using social insurance funds as
investment capital. Universal social policies and universal
education both paved the way for accepting the welfare state
as an agent of solidarity, and these first measures served as
important manifestations of solidarity and unity within the
nation (Hiilamo 2014).
Compared to other Nordic countries Finland’s political
party structure deviates in ways that to some extent also can
be attributed to the need for unity after the Civil War. One of
the most important differences is the large and strong Agrar-
ian party that has taken a watershed position between the
left and the right (Alestalo 1986, 114-115). Consequently,
compared to Sweden, for example, the questions of sparsely
populated, remote rural areas and support for agriculture and
small farming have been a more explicit part of the wel-
fare state’s agenda. The great size of Finland’s Centre Party
(Suomen Keskusta, founded as the Agrarian League) not
only reflects the fact that the country’s agricultural popula-
tion has historically been much larger than in Scandinavia or
in Western Europe (Alestalo 1986, 25) but also is a result of
the divisions in the rural areas caused by the Civil War. The
Centre Party came to offer alternatives to both communist
and conservative agendas by projecting the image of a united
rural population front. As a realistic alternative to commu-
nism, the Centre Party integrated, for example, welfare poli-
cies and workers’ rights for the rural areas in its political
agendas (Kettunen 2001). In comparison, the Swedish wel-
fare state was more explicitly and extensively built around
an ideology of “factory chimney” social democracy. The
Swedish working class has had a higher level of mobilization
and a more stable governmental dominance over time (Koso-
nen 2002; Salminen 1987, 38; for an overview of Finnish
political parties, see, e.g., Mickelsson 2007). In contempo-
rary times, a notable difference from other Nordic countries
is that Finland does not have a strict political block system;
rather, the government can be mixed between parties of the
left and right (Pesonen 2001, 121).
A further circumstance that distinguishes Finland from
other Nordic welfare states has been the relationship with
the Soviet Union, which for many years had to be balanced
and kept friendly. This left its mark on both national and
international policymaking until the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. The rise of Finland’s current universal wel-
fare state began in the 1960s, later than in other Nordic
countries. As the welfare agenda took shape, the state be-
gan to assume an all-encompassing responsibility for health
care and social welfare. According to Hiilamo (2014), until
the early 1990s, there was no reason to challenge the social
democratic welfare state hypothesis: “The Nordic countries
had developed comprehensive earnings-related benefits for
the employed and flat rate benefits for individuals outside the
labour market, leaving hardly any room for selective church
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poor relief or inclusion Programmes at the state or munici-
pal levels” (Hiilamo 2014, 303). In fact, in the late 1980s,
the general conception was that the Nordic welfare state had
provided a permanent solution for such matters as the prob-
lem of poverty in Finland. Income inequality was then the
lowest in the industrialized world (ibid.).
In the early 1990s, the situation changed. Finland was
hit by a great economic recession. Although the recession
was followed by a recovery starting in 1994 and the country
went on to experience robust economic growth, basic benefits
were left to stagnate. In the early 2000s, Finland chose not
to reverse the cutbacks in social protection and allowed in-
flation to erode existing benefits even further. Despite steady
economic growth and strong public finances, only minor im-
provements were made to basic welfare benefits, which has
led to labelling the Finnish welfare state as a case of “per-
manent austerity” (Alanko & Outinen 2016; Hiilamo 2014,
304, 306). It has been claimed that Finland began to edge
away from the ideals of the universal welfare model in the
1990s. This study looks for traces of this breakage in the
action plans and visions of the highest political leadership.
Recent developments
In most Western societies, since the early 1990s, eco-
nomic and ideological pressures have made larger rationale-
based public sector change initiatives unavoidable. Particu-
larly after the recession of the 1990s, the high tax level in the
Nordic countries began to be heavily criticized as harming
the dynamics of business life and economic growth (A. Kan-
tola & Kautto 2002, 40-41). The pressures to make the pub-
lic sector more affordable reached record intensity after the
global financial crisis in 2008. In some cases, the courses of
action taken have been shown to affect the scope, mandates
and accountability of service provision in ways that may un-
dermine the political objectives of inclusion and universalism
of welfare states (Bryson et al. 2014; Curry 2014; Walker et
al. 2011). Hintsa (2003) has studied Finnish administrations’
modes of governance in the years 1987-2003, identifying in-
terventionist, welfare and competitive models. Both Hintsa’s
(2003) and Lähdesmäki’s (2003) studies of this period note
the governments’ increasing dependence on corporate mod-
els and a distancing from universalist aims.
The new welfare state threats and pressures have engaged
the social sciences in analyses of new governance trends
and their implications for the welfare state ethos. Around
the mid-1990s, welfare state research thus came to change
its focus from characterizing welfare state systems to un-
derstanding the processes that dismantled the same (start-
ing with Pierson 1995). The most recent developments in
welfare state governance are often portrayed as an ideolog-
ically steered broad implementation of praxis that severely
weakens the state’s core obligations to its citizens (Hal-
metoja 2015). For example, Kosonen (2002 [1993]) de-
scribes how from the 1960s to the 1980s, welfare systems
following a Nordic model were institutionalized in Finland
but that “[i]n the 1990s, this development has come to an
end, and all proposals point to cuts and reductions in so-
cial transfers and public services” (Kosonen 2002 [1993],
45). The social scientific dogma seems to be that of an ideo-
logical breakage with the welfare state ethos in the 1990s.
However, the characteristics of the Finnish welfare model
since 2000 are still those of affordable services available
to all; partly citizenship-based, partly occupational life- and
income-based benefits; small discrepancies in incomes; and
a large number of women in occupational life (see Kantola
& Kautto 2002).
Recent research indicates that the current government, led
by Centre party member Juha Sipilä from 2015 to 2019, has
taken on a new governmentality incarnated in strategic vi-
sionary government programmes (Elomäki et al. 2016). This
mode of governance introduces new conditions for politi-
cal agency and expertise channelled in semantics that in-
volve terms such as flexibility, efficiency, new companion-
ships, profitability, productivity, competitiveness, know-how,
innovation and strategy thinking (ibid., 379, referring to;
Julkunen 2010; Kantola 2006; Kuusela & Ylönen 2013).
Elomäki and colleagues (2016) have dubbed it “the strategic
government” (“strateginen valtio”).
There are some interesting structural-political circum-
stances that must be noted regarding the role of the plat-
forms in the transformation into strategic government. A cir-
cumstance that very much concerns the Nordic welfare state
ethos is the changed role that the governments’ platforms
play in the system. For public institutions of the executive
power, that is, the structural backbone of the system’s imple-
mentation, the platforms serve as overall guidelines for their
upcoming work period, albeit acknowledging and respecting
their autonomous position, praxis and functions as the exec-
utive sector. Over time, the platforms have tended to become
increasingly detailed and lengthy – a circumstance already
discussed in an alarmed tone in a report from 2010 by the
Finnish Innovation Fund SITRA (Määttä & Sitra 2010). It
notes that flexible top-down governance is obstructed by gov-
ernment programmes that are too sectorial and detailed: “De-
tailed programmes in difficult political questions may clarify
the government’s work, but [the details] make it more diffi-
cult to change the programme during the time in power, even
if there would be a need for them [adjustments]” (Määttä &
Sitra 2010, 36). The lack of possibilities to make strategic
changes during the cabinet’s time in office is noted as a prob-
lem.
As a consequence of the frustration over the platforms’
growing format, during the National Coalition-led mixed
coalition government in 2014-2015 (Stubb), a Develop-
ment Project for State Governance, the so called OHRA-
programme was contracted, suggesting a shift from the broad
platforms that include concrete measures to ‘strategic’ plat-
forms (VM 2014). The aim of the OHRA-programme, as
stated in the title of the main document, was to shift from
“decisions” to “changes”. The programme states that the
recent Finnish government programmes had been too abun-
dant with regard to different aims, resulting in ‘unclear po-
litical visions’. The OHRA programme emphasized that
the work of the government should be presented in larger
alignments and that the specifics would be left to be de-
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cided upon by the government during its time in office. In
the OHRA-programme, strategic planning was suggested to
be combined with a ‘plan of action’ (toimintasuunnitelma)
and a public financial plan, to be backed up with knowledge
(VM 2014). A research programme was created within the
Finnish Academy to fund ‘strategic research’ (research fund-
ing 2017; VM 2014). Although the platform by Sipilä’s cab-
inet (2015-2019) does not explicitly refer to the OHRA pro-
gramme, the analysis shows that it is very much articulating
its visions both in content and format (see also Elomäki et al.
2016). Common sense would indeed suggest that detailed
programmes tend to lock in the execution of certain agendas,
whereas more overall visions leave room for ad hoc top down
management. However, what do these formats imply with re-
gard to the strength of the welfare state ethos in government
programmes?
Finnish government programmes are not a new subject
of study; they have been previously examined with differ-
ent objectives (e.g., Borg 1965; Ekman 2016; Erkkilä 2010;
Hakovirta & Koskiaho 1973; Ketola 2008; Kärki 2015;
Saarinen et al. 2014). Regarding the governmental discourse,
previous research has shown, for example, that the rhetoric in
Vanhanen’s second programme (2007-2011) stressed econ-
omy and efficiency concerning welfare policy (Kesälahti
2011). In 2006, Anu Kantola (2006) analysed governmental
texts and programmes starting in the late 1980s and showed
that competitive rhetoric drawn from private company man-
agement discourse had already reached a peak. Although
Finnish government programmes have on many occasions
served as study materials, there is a lack of analyses from
longer periods of developments in view genre and of welfare
state agendas.
Material and proceedings
To perform a diachronic inquiry into the welfare state
ethos in governmental programmes, three questions were
posed to the material: (1) What are the overall aims and di-
rection construed? Will, for example, the breakage in the
1990s, as noted by several previous studies (Hiilamo 2014;
Niemelä 2008), be visible in the governmental discourse? (2)
What are the characteristics of the genre of the proposed pro-
gramme, and what are its functions? What will the OHRA-
suggested turn towards more broadly held visions imply in
view of the welfare state ethos? (3) What types of priori-
ties and ideologies are reflected in the concepts and language
used? Here, we were particularly interested in changes that
indicate a drifting from a use of language that incorporates
universalism and inclusion. Is there some type of ideological
shift occurring in the programmes over time in general and,
more specifically, in view of the changes studied in questions
1 and 2?
To obtain a longer view of the developments of the gov-
ernmentality discourse of the Finnish welfare state, we ex-
amined government programmes starting with the year 1950
(all programmes are available on the internet at a. Valtioneu-
vosto2016a). The decision to include early programmes en-
abled us to observe the first constructs of an emerging wel-
fare state. From the government’s internet pages, each ad-
ministration’s programme was copy-pasted into a main doc-
ument (total length: 119,596 words). During the first read-
ings, segments addressing issues of social welfare and health
were coded and separated. These segments (ca. 15,000
words) were studied in more detail, posing the three re-
search questions regarding the aims and direction construed,
the characteristics of the genre and their functions, priori-
ties and ideologies reflected in the concepts and language
used). This framework of aims-functions-concepts was em-
ployed as a qualitative content analytical tool (see Bowen
2009), in line with basic semiotic approaches on the ways in
which ontologies and epistemologies are formulated in text
to fix, strengthen and push progress towards certain resolu-
tions (see, e.g., Alasuutari & Qadir 2014; Hellman & Room
2015; Lyotard 1984).
The analysis follows a governmentality tradition that links
welfare state governance with ideas, as expressed in po-
litical text (see, e.g., Bacchi 2009; McKee 2009; Rose &
Miller 1992). As political declarations, the platforms in-
volve expressions of governmentality, which is a gathering
term used for the mentalities, rationalities, and techniques
through which subjects are governed and which governments
use to adjust the collectives suited to fulfil their policies. The
governments, their time in power, the political stance of the
prime minister and the programmes’ length are shown in the
appendix table 1.
The character of the programmes has changed over time.
In the 1950s and 1960s, the statements consisted of short
paragraphs and concerned the stability of the nation. Sub-
sequently, they became more ideological and incorporated a
clear social welfare ethos. In the third phase, they were long
declarations of action with clearly stated visions and goals.
After the OHRA project, which set out to shorten the pro-
grammes and shift them from concrete objectives to ‘strate-
gic’ governing, the most recent programme has taken a new
form.
In the stage of selecting the studied material from the pro-
grammes, the researchers had to decide what to classify as
social and health issues. The first programmes do not con-
tain action plans or specific visions of what the administra-
tion wished to achieve, and it was difficult to separate welfare
questions from other issues, given that conceptual political
categories for these matters did not exist in the same man-
ner as they do today. In the earliest programmes, develop-
ing better welfare and social security could be expressed in
terms of labour-market policies and aims for developing ru-
ral areas. The later programmes included clear articulations
of social and health policy aims. In the earlier programmes,
we identified some general political strategies for the wel-
fare, wellbeing and good health of the population; we viewed
these questions as corresponding to the types of material that
would later be explicitly placed in the social and health care
sectors. In this article, accounts of the developments are gen-
eralized, and many interesting and important thematic traits
in the developments of the questions have been omitted, ow-
ing to the lack of space.
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Before taking up the analysis, it is important to remind
the reader that because Finland does not have a strict block
party system for the constellation of the cabinet, the main
visions do not have to be either left or right in character
but can be mixed. Particularly in the later years, the pro-
grammes of majority coalition governments have been the
results of intense and complicated negotiations between the
parties in office. A good example of a mixed agenda is
Jyrki Katainen’s programme from 2011 – a government pop-
ularly referred to as “the six pack”. Both the National Coali-
tion Party (Kokoomus, on the right) and the Left Alliance
(Vasemmistoliitto) were among the six parties involved in
this government.
In the long view, the trend in Finnish governments’ po-
litical composition can be summarized as “from minority
governments to majority coalitions” (Valtioneuvosto 2016b).
Since its independence in 1917, Finland has had 73 govern-
ments and 43 prime ministers. The longest-serving govern-
ments have been those led by Prime Minister Paavo Lippo-
nen, a Social Democrat, whose two administrations in the
1990s totalled 1,464 days. Of all Finnish administrations,
45 have been majority governments; 19 have been minority
governments; and 9 have been non-partisan caretaker/civil
servants’ governments. Finland’s last minority or caretaker
government was in the mid-1970s (ibid.). As shown in
Table 1, the 1950s and early 1960s saw diverse and ever-
changing coalitions. The key party was the Agrarian Union
(which would become the Centre Party). Between 1966 and
1987, governments were mainly based on centre-left coali-
tions, sometimes termed popular-front governments. A left-
right coalition led by Harri Holkeri served between 1987 and
1991, followed by a non-socialist centre-right coalition be-
tween the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party in
1991-1995 led by Esko Aho. In the Lipponen government,
elected in 1995, the Greens and a broad spectrum of leftist
parties were represented, in addition to the National Coali-
tion Party. The traditional red-earth government co-operation
between the Centre Party and the Social Democrats was re-
sumed in 2003 when Anneli Jäätteenmäki’s government took
office – a work that was performed by Matti Vanhanen’s
first government 2003 after Jäätteenmäki’s resignation (Ibid.)
Vanhanen’s second government, from the spring of 2007,
was a majority coalition formed by the Centre Party, the Na-
tional Coalition Party, the Green League and the Swedish
People’s Party of Finland. A traditionally liberal party, the
Swedish People’s Party has participated in almost all of the
various coalitions but is notably absent in the current govern-
ment (ibid.).
Analysis
Based on the analysis of the coded parts of the material,
three coherent periods emerge as discursive entities: the first
from the 1950s through the 1970s; the second, the 1980s and
1990s; and the third beginning at the beginning of the 2000s.
The programme of the current government (2015) deviated
to a degree in that it was viewed as representing a category
of its own within the third phase. The programmes for each
Figure 1. : An average length (in words) of Government Pro-
grammes in the three periods found in the study (361, 4371, and,
11358). Years given according to the government’s starting year.
Period division according to the analytical scope of programmes’
characteristics. The first 29 programs (1950-1979) constitute the
first group, the next seven platforms (1982-2003) constitute the
second group and the third phase include the latest 7 programmes
(2003-2015) (see appendix table 1 for the governments periods).
period bear certain similarities in the three areas of analytical
inquiries: first, the overall aims of the country’s direction in
terms of welfare policies are reflected in general visions that
are apparent in priorities and the language used and in the
numbers of topics and details. Naturally, these aims should
be viewed in the historical context in which they were for-
mulated. Second, the periods can be distinguished by the
genre character of the government programmes. The roles of
the programmes in their own political context of origin and
their aims for the welfare state are revealed in how the gov-
ernment views its tasks and positions itself in the text. Third,
particular concepts bear witness to each political leadership’s
priorities. The average lengths for each period are shown in
Figure 1.
The first phase: Building a Finnish welfare state,
1950s-1970s
The thirteen programmes from the 1950s are short decla-
rations with an average of 364 words (475 counting appen-
dices). They articulate goals for stabilizing the country and
maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. “Specifi-
cally, with regard to developing and consolidating friendly
relationships with the Soviet Union and Finland, Finland
will follow the content and the spirit of the agreements that
the Finnish and Soviet relationships are based on” (1953_
Tuomioja).1
Tearing down the “tyrannical rules from war time”
(1950_Kekkonen) and creating jobs (1953_ Tuomioja) were
1 In parentheses: the year of the programme and the name of the
prime minister. Translations from Finnish into English are made by
authors.
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strategies for developing Finland’s economy. The 1954 pro-
gramme formulated the government’s “aim at upholding a
policy that will keep the developments moving forward by
taking as its goal improving the population’s wellbeing and
increasing social security within the framework of improving
the endurance of the nation’s economy” (1954_Törngren).
A view of developments in agricultural life, improving
conditions for small farmers and improving life for inhabi-
tants in rural and remote areas as a basis for prosperity and
welfare are apparent throughout the 1950s: “Agriculture and
forestry and ensuring the jobs of the rural population with
proper means are to be secured against competition from
abroad” (1959_Sukselainen).
The improvement of the life conditions of citizens in ru-
ral areas is viewed as an important welfare political aim of
the country as a whole. In 1959 (Fagerholm), the govern-
ment says that it will take measures to rationalize agriculture
externally and internally and the income of the agricultural
population’s relative living standard: “With the help of agri-
cultural support measures, the inequity that part-time unem-
ployment has imposed upon the interpretation of the vaca-
tion law will be corrected. The government will start prepar-
ing implementation of health insurance” (1958_Fagerholm).
Sukselainen’s cabinet from 1959 promises to act “in line with
the existing law on agricultural income” and to aim at se-
curing the benefits of agricultural smallholders and the life
status of the rural population. In 1961, the concept of a fair
social policy (oikeudenmukainen sosiaalipolitiikka) is used
to describe the goal of guaranteeing the rights of all popula-
tion groups, with special attention given to those living in the
least favourable economic and social conditions (1961_Mi-
ettunen).
Ahti Karjalainen’s Centre Party programme from 1962 is
the first to include a section on social policy. The themes
concern health security for all citizen groups, referred to as
“population circuits” (väestöpiirit) and “population groups”
(väestöryhmät). A core question concerns how working
hours could be shortened to strengthen workers’ wellbeing
but allowing the country to remain competitive. The gov-
ernment announces its support for the labour unions’ aims
for a 40-hour work week. A gradual rise in child benefits
(lapsilisä) is declared, and economic resources delegated for
housing construction address the housing shortage.
The late 1950s and the 1960s involve great investments in
universal and egalitarian reforms in Finland. The national
pension reform in 1957, the introduction of general sick-
ness insurance in 1964, and the pension reforms in the 1960s
would allow Finland to suddenly leap from a social secu-
rity coverage laggard to one of the top countries in Western
Europe (Alestalo et al. 1985, 193-194). Although the plat-
forms from this time are not specified declarations of how
the institutionalized social and health service provisions are
to be realized, the programmes show a great deal of visions
of a structural implementation of welfare in an egalitarian
and universal spirit.
The view of work and employment issues as the basis for
welfare and standards of a good life is expressed throughout
the early 1960s. In the 1966 programme of Social Demo-
crat Rafael Paasio, universal welfare goals are integrated into
the text: different citizen groups are to receive fair and equal
treatment, and in particular, the conditions of the lowest in-
come groups are to be improved. Housing and pensions to-
gether with the influence of labour market organizations on
private employers are emphasized. Overall, the programme
expresses the goal of developing policies of equal treatment
and inclusion of all.
The government programmes of this time bear witness
to a welfare state being constructed through collective mea-
sures, which would create equal opportunities for people of
different potentials and backgrounds. The next four pro-
grammes (1968-1972) show the building of a welfare state
with a social policy ethos. The heading “Social Questions”
in Mauno Koivisto’s statement of 1968 shows the intention
to counteract injustice, democratize occupational life and im-
prove health care. The programme of the Centre Party’s Ahti
Karjalainen, 1970, under the subheading “Social Policy and
Health Care”, suggests a number of basic social policy im-
provements and makes promises: the differences between
pensions are to be decreased; families and retired people are
to be given more help; children’s day-care is to be improved.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the programmes explicitly artic-
ulate the universalistic values known to underpin the Nordic
welfare state: the redress of injustice and minimum social
security guaranteed for all citizens. Furthermore, the groups
to be helped are typically named: farmers, people of low and
middle incomes, families with children, the young, employ-
ees, and workers (1972_Paasio). In Kalevi Sorsa’s Social
Democratic programme of 1977, “Social Policy” appears as
a separate subheading for the first time. Groups that need to
be helped and considered are specifically noted in the para-
graphs on pension security (veterans, widows, people who
work in the home and are therefore not included in the pen-
sion system) and social security (families with children, sin-
gle parents, young couples, the elderly, war invalids, stay-at-
home mothers). Two years later (1979), Koivisto’s platform
makes it clear that a welfare society is still in the making:
“The government will continue to develop health care, social
care, the care for the elderly and child welfare and make the
necessary legal proposals [for doing so]”.
Second phase: Strengthening and improving the
welfare state structure, the 1980s and 1990s
In 1983, the government programme by Sorsa still envi-
sions a welfare state developing its provisions and basic ser-
vices, but the programmes now also begin to employ verbs
that refer to the maintenance of an existing level of service,
improving the availability of arrangements already in place
and making these more efficient: “The government aims at
developing health care in a manner that allows better acces-
sibility to services, and it will improve the sustainability of
the treatment relationship” (1983_Sorsa). Both interest par-
ties – the groups to be assured rights and services and the
government as an actor to ensure their interests – are spelled
out in an active voice. In Harri Holkeri’s National Coali-
tion Party government (1987), which had a heavy Social
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Democratic emphasis despite its conservative prime minis-
ter, phrases such as “the government will improve” (Halli-
tus parantaa) and “The government will continue” (Hallitus
jatkaa) are used. The formulations mediate the notion of a
construction of the welfare state as still partly ongoing but
in a different fashion from the 1960s and 1970s. The groups
identified as needing to be better integrated and included are
not so much the farmers and rural population groups but the
homeless, the retired and the elderly. The pension system for
small entrepreneurs is to be improved, and private service
providers would complement public institutions as needed.
During the depression of 1991, the programme of the Esko
Aho-led government (Centre Party) includes the subheading
“Social and Health Care”. Here, the Government expresses
its intention to improve (not to found or develop) the popu-
lation’s basic social security [‘perusturvallisuus’]. The pro-
gramme frames the economic recession from a social per-
spective:
In times when matters are economically
tight, it is important to guarantee peoples’ mini-
mum income at different stages of life. The ba-
sic security is to be strengthened within the lim-
its of possibility of the state’s economy, consid-
ering the social compensation measures caused
by the economic invigoration. (1991_Aho)
The government is to “simplify” the basic income system
(Perustoimeentulojärjestelmiä yksinkertaistetaan). The stan-
dard of services is to be secured and developed to ensure
social equality: “To secure and develop the standard of ser-
vices, the policy of payment must be reorganized, bearing in
mind social inequality; the collaboration between social and
health care, as well as the administration, is to be simplified”.
In 1991, there is a call for efficiency; however, viewed in ret-
rospect, the programme contains a clear social ethos. The
country is to prepare for incoming refugees and is to aim at
decreasing alcohol consumption, particularly among young
people.
In the first of the two subsequent programmes – one in
1995 and the other in 1999 – under Paavo Lipponen (Social
Democrat), a social and health care policy and the develop-
ment of work and employment are presented in a somewhat
comprehensive manner: these programmes are lengthier and
more specific in content than ever before. This is partly be-
cause the Platforms were formulated by a government with
mixed interests and ideologies: in both Lipponen govern-
ments, there were members of the National Coalition Party,
the Greens, the Left Party and the Swedish People’s Party, in
addition to Social Democrats. In the 2,697-word statement
of 1995, certain aims are justified in ways that reflect typ-
ical contemporary universal welfare state values: “Society
[Yhteiskunta] is to guarantee basic service for all population
groups. The public service provision system forms the base
of the social and health care services” (1995_Lipponen). The
private sector, organizations in the social and health sector
and “the work conducted by close relatives and loved ones”
are viewed only as complementing this base. Equality in
the public sector is to be ensured through work/occupational
policies: “The conditions for employment and other ser-
vice conditions will be developed according to the princi-
ples of parity between employees. The government will
improve equality in working life and the principle of equal
pay through co-operation with labour market organizations”
(1995_Lipponen).
The second Lipponen government (1999) has the most ex-
tensive social political agenda of all 42 programmes and in-
cludes a separate section on “social and health care policy
and work life”. The introductory sentence states:
The point of departure for the government’s
social policy is the maintenance of the Nordic
welfare state. The goal is to develop a soci-
ety that guarantees all people the opportunity
to manage their own lives and actively partic-
ipate. A core field of government emphasis
will be to promote measures by which serious
poverty problems, marginalization and a pile-
up of disadvantages are prevented and reduced.
The quality and availability of social and health
care services will be guaranteed in all parts of
the country. (1999_Lipponen)
The welfare state ethos is expressed immediately at the start:
“An active social policy entails the prevention of poverty and
social exclusion”. Furthermore, an ideological position on
the state’s role is articulated: “The arrangement of social and
health services, which is the responsibility of public author-
ities, must be accessible to all, and they should be paid for
largely through taxes”.
The point of departure is a large and developed public sec-
tor that requires no justification (as was the case in the pro-
grammes from the 1970s and 1980s) but, instead, is made
more efficient to serve the ideal of a fair and equal Nordic
welfare model. The programme aims at equalization, with
special allowances and services for groups with special prob-
lems (erityisryhmien ongelmat).
The Lipponen platform of 1999 articulates the most exten-
sive vision of the universal and egalitarian welfare state of all
the programmes, including values to be secured and concrete
actions to be taken to secure the standards and to develop
the welfare state into something more efficient and better. In
the next phase, the programmes move even closer towards
action agendas; they have new functions and are positioned
in a different manner vis-à-vis other societal sectors.
Third phase: Lengthy action plans, 2003 - 2015
In 2003, the programme of the Centre Party government
originally led by Anneli Jäätteenmäki contains declarations
on how to integrate and synchronize policy development and
projects in the social and health sectors. In this era, greater
emphasis begins to be placed on the municipality as a service
producer. The idea is that the welfare state should primarily
be managed within the structures offered by the municipality
system: “The Government will increase resources in pub-
lic health and social care, and it will develop competence,
service structures and ways of working together over the
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long term with the municipalities in accordance with the Na-
tional Health Project’s principal decision” (2003_Jäätteen-
mäki). At this point, the municipality emphasis coincides
with the goals of efficiency in the social and health care sec-
tors. This is in line with previous research that has dated a
strong New Public Management (NPM) discourse to the late
1990s and the 2000s in the ambitions set for how local gov-
ernment units should implement ambitions in these fields in
the most cost-efficient manner (see Niemelä 2008; Sulkunen
2006).
The 2003 programme further states: “Population health
inequalities will be sought to be reduced with the help of
goal-orientated health and social policy measures as well as
by strengthening the aspects of health and social wellbeing in
societal decision-making”. The governed are no longer noted
as groups; rather, a passive voice is used for describing phe-
nomena (health inequalities, health, achieving wellbeing).
Verbs in the passive voice are frequently used: “The use of
vouchers will be investigated” (selvitetään); “the recovery of
war invalids is to be developed” (kehitetään); “the quality
of the care of the elderly is to be improved” (parannetaan).
The welfare system user is an individual: “The system must
be clear and predictable for the individual and must able to
ensure adequate security. The livelihood and survival of the
citizen [ihminen] must be viewed from the comprehensive
perspective of work, taxation, social security and services”.
Essentially, the tasks are to develop and renew, and they are
listed to guarantee service availability.
In the programme led by Matti Vanhanen (Centre Party,
2007-2010), new challenges are presented:
Population ageing, labour market transfor-
mations and globalization pose new challenges
for the Finnish welfare society and working life.
By encouraging and disseminating basic secu-
rity and safety in peoples’ everyday life, the gov-
ernment aims at improving the effectiveness and
diversity of services and enhancing human well-
being. Finland’s welfare in the 2010s requires
a strong economy and high employment rates.
(2007_Vanhanen)
The basis for a functioning welfare state is now articulated as
a sound economy and high levels of employment. The basis
of health and wellbeing rests in economic success and vice
versa: “Healthy and highly capable people are the foundation
of Finland’s economic success and competitiveness. Health
and social policy aims to promote health, functional capacity
and independence and to reduce health disparities between
different population groups” (2007_Vanhanen).
The key to counteracting marginalization is strengthening
productivity and job availability:
The aim is to support the increase in produc-
tivity and labour supply. Work is also the best
way of preventing social exclusion and combat-
ting poverty. The high level of competence of
employees, an atmosphere supporting creativity,
wellbeing and functioning labour markets are
important national success factors.
The availability of choices for families and cross-sectoral
partnerships are stressed: “Families are to be supported and
service choices improved by increasing partnerships between
the public, private and third sectors” (2007_Vanhanen).
The programme of the National Coalition Party-led mixed
government from 2011, led by Jyrki Katainen, shows how
both the historical context and the political system colour
Finnish governmental programmes. The context is the so-
called jytky, a surprisingly large win by the populist True
Finns Party (today, called the Finns Party) in the spring elec-
tion of 2011. Jyrki Katainen had a difficult job assembling
a government that would represent a parliamentary major-
ity but exclude the True Finns. The result was a so-called
rainbow government, also referred to as ‘the six pack’: the
National Coalition Party, the Social Democratic Party, the
Green Party, the Swedish People’s Party, the Christian Party
and the Left Party. In the programme’s lengthy text, a record
26,737 words, the section headed “Welfare Policy” includes
a mention of the Nordic welfare society:
Healthy citizens, education, a high employ-
ment rate, comprehensive income security, and
impactful health and social services are the con-
ditions of the Nordic welfare society’s social
and economic sustainability. The main focus
in developing social security is the improve-
ment of quality, accessibility and effectiveness
of services and in the development of benefits
such that the livelihood for each [citizen] is se-
cured. Social security helps strengthen the sense
of community and encourages action to promote
personal wellbeing and taking responsibility for
oneself and for loved ones. (2011_Katainen)
The justification of the services and their quality is now
partly to be found in a life quality argument. In comparison,
Lipponen’s 1999 programme envisioned the aims ideologi-
cally: the point of departure was a social policy that would
guarantee preserving the Nordic welfare state, and society
would be developed to improve opportunity for equal par-
ticipation. Although the first paragraph in Katainen’s pro-
gramme of 2007 contains elements similar to Lipponen’s,
the wellbeing of citizens is now directly connected with
economic sustainability and the quality and availability of
services. If Lipponen’s perspective in the rear-view mirror
seems to be that of a political leadership envisioning a coun-
try built on ideals, then Katainen’s perspective is increasingly
that of a manager who will improve and steer services so that
they will lead to the same type of envisioned wellbeing.
It is clear that much of Katainen’s extensive programme
was decided in lengthy negotiations between very different
views on state governance (among the six pack). The re-
sult was that detailed tasks are now spelled out, with large
and small questions mixed. Work has a central role in im-
proving wellbeing. Guarantees for basic economic support
for the weakest and poorest groups are increased. Visions
and actions are connected: “The income support guidelines
will be specified, considering in particular the prevention
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of intergenerational poverty and social exclusion. Simulta-
neously, citizens are encouraged to take responsibility for
their own lives” (2011_Katainen). The programme presents
myriad large and small plans for actions and interventions,
among them, restructuring social and welfare services, en-
suring emergency and duty services, realizing service strate-
gies, guaranteeing medical helicopter service, updating the
national HIV plan, access to abortion, monitoring and fol-
lowing up the consequences of gambling, and a better lan-
guage translation service at the Social Security Institution of
Finland (KELA). In view of the long negotiations and com-
promises made in Katainen’s platform, the OHRA initiative
seems a logical next move. The OHRA project was set to
steer towards a new method of establishing platforms that
would be less binding and allow more ‘strategic’ visions sup-
ported by knowledge of the country’s economy and ‘policy-
relevant’ academic research.
The citizen is in Katainen’s platform now called the client
or the consumer (in Finnish, asiakas). The term is noted in
the first paragraph; further on, invalids, the elderly and chil-
dren are referred to as “client groups” (asiakasryhmät). The
programme does not speak of “marginalized people/groups”
but of syrjäytyminen, that is, marginalization as a phe-
nomenon. An interesting question that may be a result of
the colourful crowd in the administration is the theme of
transparency in service chains, a question easily agreed upon.
Transparency is always needed when those in charge do not
agree on aims. The picture that the reader obtains from this
very lengthy and detailed programme is that in the course of
setting up the government, the parties brought all questions
that they wanted to include to the table for negotiation. Once
a compromise position was agreed upon in wording, it was
integrated into the programme. The document is permeated
with expertise on political issues and on the system and its
institutions. It is clear that professional politicians – those
highest ranked – from somewhat established older parties
(even the somewhat young Green Party was by then well es-
tablished) had worked together. In the background is a great
deal of competence, although the number of disagreements
may have contributed to the great detail. The signal to the
executive sector, that is, the civil servants in the ministries
and municipalities, is that this programme offers a detailed
plan that can be followed similarly to a road map.
In the last year of the six-pack party governmental period,
Katainen stepped down, and his National Coalition Party col-
league Alexander Stubb replaced him as prime minister. The
platform by Stubb is a short supplement orientated towards
business life and boosting the Finnish economy. The words
Suomi and suomalaiset (“Finland” and “Finnish people”) are
notably employed in Stubb’s programme, which is called
"Growth, entrepreneurship, jobs and prosperity for Finns”.
Finland’s ability to compete is stressed:
The government is systematically seeking
new ways to improve Finland’s competitiveness,
strengthen the operating conditions of the export
industry, increase purchasing power and domes-
tic demand, reduce barriers to entrepreneurship,
promote employment and support high-quality
teaching. Decision-making supporting compe-
tition is to be structured, predictable and long
term. (2014_Stubb)
Suomi is now the protagonist, which needs to get on its feet
similar to a company in the business world: “In all activities,
Finland emphasizes the importance of the principle of corpo-
rate responsibility”. A network called “Team Finland” is to
be consulted to ensure economic growth. Stubb also issues
some strategic programmes that go along with the declara-
tions (see Table 1)
Although changes had been coming gradually, a real char-
acter transformation in the Government Programmes oc-
curred in 2015. Led by Juha Sipilä (Centre Party), whose
background includes leading positions with several compa-
nies, the three-party government (the Centre Party, the Na-
tional Coalition and the True Finns) formulates a platform
that although not very lengthy (9,798 words), is the first to
contain numerous graphs and figures in the running text; it
resembles a corporate development outlook. In the section
“Wellbeing and Health”, we find the statement “Objectives
and their measurement set in a ten-year goal: Finns feel bet-
ter and feel that they can manage in different life situations”.
This sentence is indicative of the programme as a whole:
it contains a vision of self-confident self-governing citizens,
somewhat different from the visions of, for example, Lippo-
nen’s second government from 1999. The programme from
2015 states:
Differently aged people’s responsibility for
their own health status and lifestyle is supported.
The promise of public service is defined within
the framework of the society’s economic capac-
ity. People’s choices in different life situations
are enabled to a greater extent.... People’s op-
portunities to make their own choices are en-
abled. (2015_Sipilä)
The programme enumerates in short points the action to be
taken: “A national programme that promotes mental health
and prevents loneliness will be launched. – A comprehensive
reform of the rehabilitation system will be implemented. –
A report on lonely people’s position in society will be con-
ducted. – Substance abuse rehabilitation will be made more
efficient”.
However, nowhere are these aims concretized with de-
tailed descriptions of their implementation in the welfare in-
stitutions, as in Katainen’s programme (2011), nor are they
envisioned as value choices, as in Lipponen’s second pro-
gramme (1999). Although there are promises for improv-
ing home services for the elderly, for instance, and the living
conditions for others, nowhere is it stated how these improve-
ments will be realized. A sample sentence is “A sense of
community and intergenerational contact is to be enhanced
[‘lisätään’]”; however, how this aim is to be achieved is left
unspecified. It is clear that this platform has adapted the
strategic governance suggested by OHRA.
The ideals of the autonomous capable citizen has now
pushed ideas of universalist solutions aside, and the format
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gives room to new, more flexible management models. The
Sipilä programme does not specify its aims, and therefore,
it does not lock in any details. It offers seemingly sim-
ple goals and visions, leaving the interpretation of execution
for future situation-based flexible governmental decision-
making. Whereas the ministries’ civil servants could read
Katainen’s programme of 2011 as a detailed action list, the
Sipilä blueprint is less precise and relies on interpretation to
transform its ideas into actions. In fact, the programme re-
lies on clarifying top-down governance to determine what is
actually meant when words are translated into deeds.
Whereas the lengthy Katainen programme demonstrated
that those around the negotiating table were all long-term
politicians (the six pack) who had great insight into the
state’s institutions and processes, the Sipilä programme can
perhaps be read as reflecting the limited political background
of many of the True Finns and that of a prime minister, who
had spent much of his career in business. Table 1 summarizes
the study findings. The government programme of 2015 is
presented as a separate category because it deviates so much
from the rest.
Discussion and conclusions
This study offers insight into developments in the Finnish
welfare state enterprise through the lens of the governmental
programmes’ visions concerning the social and health sec-
tors. The historical narrative that unfolds begins with gov-
ernments’ attempts to create stability in the post-war era. In
the 1950s, the programmes consist of short declarations with
a general focus mainly on national stability. The first con-
structs of Nordic welfare state policies enter the programmes
in the 1960s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the documents note
weaker societal groups in need of assistance. By the time of
Koivisto’s programme (1968), “social questions” (sosiaaliset
kysymykset) have become a topic on their own. In 1970
(Karjalainen’s second administration), there is even a sub-
heading “Social policy and health care service (Sosiaalipoli-
tiikka ja terveydenhuolto).
In the late 1980s, the welfare state as a context is more
taken for granted. The state welfare sector has grown larger
and must be secured, strengthened, developed, internally
synchronized and made more efficient. However, as late
as Paavo Lipponen’s Social Democratic programmes of the
1990s, these changes are still being envisioned, articulated
and justified in terms of basic universalist ideas, particularly
in Lipponen’s second programme (1999). By considering
the aims, character and concepts of the studied documents,
we identify a paradigm shift in the welfare state discourse
starting after Lipponen’s second programme. Several previ-
ous studies have referred to a semantics of the New Public
Management discourse occurring in the late 1980s. Erkkilä
(2010) states that Esko Aho’s platform (1991-1995) builds
“on the normative vocabulary of the New Public Manage-
ment doctrines” (Erkkilä 2010, 362). Although this may
be true, the present analysis of social and health questions
discerns a distinct paradigm shift in the government pro-
grammes pertaining to how the welfare state project was
articulated, starting with Anneli Jäätteenmäki (2003). In
fact, even Katainen’s platform (2011), which in many ways
is filled with market-liberal notions, operates very closely
along detailed welfare institutional concepts. This study
is thus able to empirically demonstrate the ways in which
Finnish coalition governments incarnate Castles hypothesis
(Castles 1978; 1982), according to which the welfare state
is not so much the product of strong social democracy but
of splits within the right wing. The colourful group of al-
lies and its adherent detailed compromise-based governmen-
tal programme format forced the right to compromise and
incorporate welfare political constructs that the more general
declarations by homogeneous cabinets need not compromise
around (e.g., the programme by Sipilä 2015). Viewed from
this perspective, the detailed programmes that specify agen-
das within the rationale of existing welfare state institutions
seem to inevitably also acknowledge the societal function of
the same institutions, and therefore, these programme for-
mats seem to be in the interest of a maintenance of the social
democratic welfare state, at least in the discursive project
of the platforms. Furthermore, the results seem to suggest
that a valence politics (see Stokes 1992) surrounding the val-
ues of the welfare state – universalist and egalitarian aims
that all parties can agree upon – is more likely to occur
in platforms that have been developed by professional cab-
inet politicians from different political backgrounds (as in
the case of Katainen’s government) than in those developed
by a smaller homogeneous right-wing group involving new
governmental actors with less specialized knowledge of the
welfare state’s institutional modus operandi (Sipilä’s current
government, which includes the Finns party).
Compared to the earlier platforms, those from the early
twenty-first century involve acting, renewing and changing
the system. Some of the most recent are so filled with ac-
tion plans, particularly Jyrki Katainen’s lengthy platform of
2011, as to be dizzying. In 2015, the decision by Juha Sipilä
of the Centre Party to co-operate with the Finns Party to form
a government of three parties whose basic ideological stance
did not strongly conflict created opportunities for the type of
managerial flexibility requested in the SITRA report, cited
at the beginning of the article (Määttä & Sitra 2010). What
can be drawn from this study is that Finland’s broad coali-
tion governments have seemed to force the political platform
discourse to include existing welfare state institutional log-
ics and arrangements. Sipilä’s programme is more top-down
and straightforward than earlier plans and deviates as well by
resembling a company managerial strategy. In comparison,
Esko Aho’s programme from the beginning of the 1990s en-
tails a somewhat comprehensive welfare state ethos, which is
almost completely lacking in Sipilä’s platform (Sipilä 2015-
). In fact, one can say that in view of the earlier statements, it
was not until Stubbs’s short 2014 blueprint that greater uni-
versalist notions have disappeared altogether.
The ways in which the formats of the declarations pro-
nounce executive goals reveal something about the relation-
ship between the positions taken by the government in view
of its executive institutions. Political historians have ex-
pressed the view that state capacity and bureaucratic auton-
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Table 1
Aims, character and scope of Finnish government programmes, 1950-2015.
TIME THEWELFARE STATE PROJECT
1950s- AIMS: From the 1950s, building a welfare state structure and system
1970s GENRE CHARACTER: Declarations, at first only a few paragraphs, then longer
CONCEPTS: From the end of the 1960s and through the 1970s: guaranteeing the rights of all citizen groups
Weak groups are named and singled out as needing special attention and inclusion; 1968, “social questions”;
1970, “social policy and health care”
1980s- AIMS: Strengthening and improving the structure of the welfare state; internal synchronization.
1990s GENRE CHARACTER: Programmes become lengthier. Express visions and give action statements.
Use not only passive forms but also active forms and designated actors.
CONCEPTS: Programmes still envision a welfare state continuing to develop its service provisions and basic
assistance, but the language now uses verbs for maintaining a certain level of service, improving the accessibility
of existing service provisions and making these more efficient.
N.B.: Lipponen’s second Government (1999) articulates the most extensive social political Programme on “social
and health care policy, and work life” of all governments. A clear sense of social ethos and ideology.
2000s AIM: Greatest emphasis is placed on declaring action. A new, sometimes vaguer role for the programmes vis-à-
vis executive professionals in the public sector (not vague in Katainen’s programme 2011).
GENRE CHARACTER: Lengthy and detailed action plans for renewing Finland and keeping the country in sync
with new challenges.
N.B.: Katainen’s (National Coalition Party) “six-pack” programme (2011) is extremely detailed, showing
compromises but also enormous expertise and knowledge input by political professionals.
CONCEPTS: Passive verb forms, phenomena, not actors. Citizens referred to as consumers (asiakas). “Finland”
also referred to as an actor (the first time it was used to this extent since the Second World War).
2015 AIM: Strategic and vague aims
GENRE CHARACTER: The Programme for 2015 resembles a managerial manual: the goal set for “wellbeing and
health” is that in ten years, the Finnish people will be healthier and more experienced in coping with different
life situations. These types of goals are symptomatic of the programme as a whole: it contains a vision for a self-
confident people, as opposed to the structure- and value-based visions of Lipponen’s second government
(1999); however, it shows lack of knowledge, experience and expertise compared to Katainen’s programme (2011).
CONCEPTS: Emphasis on action and “doing”. ’Responsibility’ and ’capacity’ by autonomous citizens; ’choices’ are
offered in service provision.
omy are measures of the quality of government and a cru-
cial premise for the stability of the Nordic welfare model
(see, e.g., Fukuyama, 2014, 506-523). The more detailed the
programmes are, the more the steering of ministerial activ-
ities is embedded in the infancy of the government’s period
in office. Sipilä’s platform (2015) deviates: although it is
presented as an action plan, the content does not articulate
action within the country’s existing institutional welfare ar-
rangement; rather, the goals are formulated in abstract terms
as “goals for Finland”.
Over the years, paradigm shifts have occurred: from the
view that Finland was a country that needed to address in-
equality, the perspective altered to articulating how to build
a welfare state with social security and health services for
all. Ultimately, it has come around to viewing problems of
governance as lying elsewhere: there are issues other than
social security and welfare. If the message of government
programmes from the 1960s to the late 1980s was to “con-
struct a system to address social and health problems collec-
tively by institutionalizing the aims of universalism, equal-
ity, inclusion”, then the message at present is “we have other
problems; let us manage the system better so that we can
afford it”. The changes in focus, concepts and aims incor-
porate new views of citizens and public power. The citizen
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is free to choose, service provision is less centralized, and
governments actively seek less bureaucracy.
The most interesting programmes from a structural-
political perspective are Lipponen’s second (1999), which
can be viewed as the height of social welfare ethos and ac-
tion, and Katainen’s (2011), in which details of implemen-
tation and the breadth of the questions bear witness to a po-
litical system in a particular situation (the coalition after the
electoral success of the True Finns). Finally, the present pro-
gramme (Sipilä 2015) demonstrates an ultimate managerial-
ism and new elements of populist discourse. Together, these
three programmes reveal an important politically driven in-
stitutional change in the contemporary Finnish welfare state.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. The respondents and the sample drawn from the Population Register of Finland
Prime Minister (PM) and period in office PM party adherence Length (words) Additions (words) Total length (words)
33.Kekkonen I (17.3.1950-17.1.1951) Center 247 247
34. Kekkonen II (17.1.1951 - 20.9.1951) Center 268 268
35. Kekkonen III (20.9.1951 - 9.7.1953) Center 413 413
36. Kekkonen IV (9.7.1953 - 17.11.1953) Center 223 223
37. Tuomioja (17.11.1953 - 5.5.1954 Care Taker (Right) 480 480
38. Törngren (5.5.1954 - 20.10.1954) Swedish 354 354
39. Kekkonen V (20.10.1954 - 3.3.1956) Center 77 490 567
40. Fagerholm II (3.3.1956 - 27.5.1957) Soc Dem 225 225
41. Sukselainen (27.5.1957 - 29.11.1957) Center 751 751
42. von Fieandt (29.11.1957 - 26.4.1958) Civil Servants 631 631
43. Kuuskoski (26.4.1958 - 29.8.1958) Civil Servants 187 187
44. Fagerholm III (29.8.1958 - 13.1.1959) Soc Dem 490 954 1,444
45. Sukselainen II (13.1.1959 - 14.7.1961) Center 391 391
46. Miettunen (14.7.1961 - 13.4.1962) Center 158 158
47. Karjalainen (13.4.1962 - 18.12.1963) Center 755 354 1,109
48. Lehto (18.12.1963 - 12.9.1964) Civil Servants 182 182
49. Virolainen (12.9.1964 - 27.5.1966) Center 227 185 412
50. Paasio (27.5.1966 - 22.3.1968) Soc Dem 540 244 784
51. Koivisto (22.3.1968 - 14.5.1970) Soc Dem 840 840
52. Aura (14.5.1970 - 15.7.1970) Lib 131 131
53. Karjalainen II (15.7.1970 - 29.10.1971) Center 1,720 305 2,025
54. Aura II (29.10.1971 - 23.2.1972) Lib 478 478
55. Paasio II (23.2.1972 - 4.9.1972) Soc Dem 783 783
56. Sorsa (4.9.1972 - 13.6.1975) Soc Dem 1,797 1,797
57. Liinamaa (13.6.1975 - 30.11.1975) Soc Dem 45 (1) 45
58. Miettunen II (30.11.1975 - 29.9.1976) Center 204 (2 ) 2,227 (3) 2,431
59. Miettunen III (29.9.1976 - 15.5.1977) Center 366 366
60. Sorsa II (15.5.1977 - 26.5.1979) Soc Dem 514 514
61. Koivisto II (26.5.1979 - 19.2.1982) Soc Dem 1,028 108 1,136
62. Sorsa III (19.2.1982 - 6.5.1983) Soc Dem 844 192 1,036
63. Sorsa IV (6.5.1983 - 30.4.1987) Soc Dem 1,787 1,787
64. Holkeri (30.4.1987 - 26.4.1991) NCP 2860 852 3712
65. Aho (26.4.1991 - 13.4.1995) Center 2697 2697
66. Lipponen (13.4.1995 - 15.4.1999) Soc Dem 3864 1023 4887
67. Lipponen II (15.4.1999 - 17.4.2003) Soc Dem 6698 6698
68. Jäätteenmäki (17.4.2003 - 24.6.2003) Center 12158 443 12601
69. Vanhanen (24.6.2003 - 19.4.2007) Center 12045 12045
70. Vanhanen II (19.4.2007-22.6.2010) Center 15354 15354
71. Kiviniemi (22.6.2010-22.6.2011) Center 1060 (4) 1060
72. Katainen (22.6.2011-24.6.2014) NCP 26737 26737
73. Stubb (24.6.2014-29.5.2015) NCP 1912 (5) strategy programmmes 1912
74. Sipilä (29.5.2015-) Center 9798 9798
1) Declaration of routines
2) Programme declaration
3) Programme from 4 March 1976
4) Continuation of Vanhanen’s Government
5) Continuation of Katainen’s Government
